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I.  INTRODUCTION 
To begin with an obvious point, economists and philosophers often 
disagree.  As a result, lawyers who are influenced by one or the other of 
those disciplines will often disagree as well. 
Compensation, however—the subject of this symposium—might seem 
to be a topic on which many economists and philosophers could agree.  
Compensatory remedies can be and have been defended from the 
standpoint of corrective justice, on the theory that corrective justice 
requires that a wrongdoer compensate those she has wronged.1  But 
compensatory remedies have also been defended by economists, and by 
others who rely on instrumental arguments, on the theory that compensatory 
remedies promote efficiency.  If both sets of arguments are correct, then 
these groups should be able to unite—at least in a marriage of 
convenience—to endorse compensatory remedies. 
This paper’s task is to argue (albeit reluctantly) against that happy union.  
In the process, I will survey the economic or instrumental arguments for 
compensation in some detail, for the benefit of those who may not have 
kept up with the economics literature.  But this is a survey with a 
purpose, which is to demonstrate the very different role that the concept 
of “compensation” plays in economic as opposed to moral theories. 
In particular, in theories of corrective justice it is often taken as 
axiomatic—or, at least, as defining of “corrective justice”—that the 
wrongdoer should compensate the wronged.  Elevating compensation to 
the status of an axiom may, of course, conform to many widely held 
moral intuitions.  However, it has proven surprisingly hard to move from 
 
 1. For convenience, and consistency with much of the corrective justice literature, 
I will often refer to the party being made to pay damages as the “wrongdoer” in the case.  
This is purely a linguistic convenience: I do not intend to imply that wrongdoing is a 
necessary condition for liability, much less to endorse any particular theory of “wrong.” 
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this sort of axiom to any concrete conclusions about what, precisely, 
compensation should include in any particular case. For example, if 
compensation consists of restoring the victim to some position he had a 
right to occupy, a substantive theory of rights is needed to define the 
baseline position.  Even then, as the papers in this conference illustrate, 
difficult problems can still arise in defining that baseline in unusual 
circumstances—for example, how much should one arsonist have to pay 
if another arsonist had already lit a fire that would have independently 
consumed the victim’s house?  Moreover, even if we agree conceptually 
on what ought to be compensated—“the loss of the house,” let us say—still 
further difficulties arise in trying to translate that loss into some specific 
number of dollars and cents.  In a nutshell, if the entitlement to 
compensation has simply been posited as a foundational axiom, it is hard 
to get much purchase on second-order questions like these. 
By contrast, in economic analysis the concept of compensation enjoys 
no such axiomatic status.  Instead, the optimal measure of damages from 
an economic standpoint is simply whatever measure of damages would 
create the best consequences—the best incentives to take precautions 
against accidents, for example; or the best incentives to gather 
information before signing a contract; or the best incentive to do any of a 
hundred things.  Obviously, the quantum of damages that happens to be 
best at achieving these instrumental goals need not coincide with the 
quantum (if any) that would be dictated by some moral theory of 
compensation. 
As I will argue in the body of the paper, this aspect of economic 
analysis has two important implications.  First, economic analysis does 
have a way—in principle, at least—of answering the various second-
order questions about compensation, even down to questions about the 
proper amount in dollars and cents.  To be sure, the instrumental 
calculations needed to answer these questions with full precision may be 
too complex to be humanly manageable, at least in the present state of 
our knowledge.  Thus, my claim is not that economics actually produces 
definitive answers: certainly not answers that are precise to two decimal 
places.  Instead, my first claim is simply that economics—unlike most 
theories of corrective justice—at least offers a method in principle for 
answering those questions.  As a result, economics also offers some basis 
against which arguments for one answer or another can be evaluated. 
Second, however, economics faces a special difficulty of its own, 
which is that the measure of damages that is best for any one 
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instrumental effect may not be the measure that is best for other effects.  
Indeed, from an economic standpoint, there may not be any single best 
remedy, or at least not any single remedy that is easily characterized.  
Instead, it may be more accurate to speak of “the remedy that is best at 
creating incentives for efficient precautions,” or “the remedy that is best 
at minimizing total risk-bearing costs,” and so on for every other 
relevant consequence.  To be sure, there will almost always be some 
measure of damages that is best “all things considered,” after each 
possible measure has been assessed for its effect on all the possible 
consequences.  But there is no reason to suppose that this amount that is 
best “all things considered” will necessarily coincide with anything that 
could plausibly be labeled as compensation, in the sense of measuring 
the value of some discrete right or interest. 
Put slightly differently, the concept of compensation itself plays no 
independent role in economic analysis.  Thus, the relevant economic 
question is never, “What is the value of a human life?” (or the value of 
an arm, or a house, or a child).  Instead, the relevant economic question 
is, “What measure of damages, if awarded whenever a human life is lost, 
will create the best consequences, all things considered?”  Thus, even if 
the number that best answers this question might plausibly be called 
compensation, the plausibility (or not) of that label plays no role in the 
economic case for awarding that particular measure.  By contrast, in most 
corrective justice theories, the moral case for awarding any particular 
measure of damages depends entirely on the plausibility of viewing that 
measure as “compensation” for the wrong.  As a result, corrective justice 
theorists must concern themselves with the very meaning of 
“compensation,” while economists are free to ignore that question. 
Why, then, might it sometimes seem that economists share a 
commitment to compensatory remedies, albeit on grounds of efficiency 
rather than of morals?  As discussed in Part II, this characterization of 
economic analysis may have been appropriate in the 1970s and 1980s, 
which were relatively early in the application of economic analysis to 
the law.  In those days, the earliest economic models identified a 
relatively small set of remedies as likely to be most efficient (for various 
purposes).  Significantly, the remedies identified by those early analyses 
often did coincide with common notions of compensation. 
For example, in contract law, early analyses showed that expectation  
damages would often create efficient incentives to perform or breach.  
Moreover, expectation damages could very easily be characterized as 
compensating the victim for the loss of the value that full performance of 
the contract would have yielded—or, as Fuller and Perdue famously put 
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it, compensating the victim for the loss of his “expectation interest.”2  In 
this case, then—and in other similar cases in tort and property law, 
which are also discussed below—it was easy to conclude that economics 
supported compensatory remedies. 
As I discuss in Part III, however, economic analysis during subsequent 
decades has complicated this simple picture.  In brief, the remedies 
identified by early analyses might still be efficient for some instrumental 
purposes, but often they will not be efficient for others.  More fundamentally, 
once we see that different damage awards may be more (or less) efficient 
for different purposes, it is also easy to see how little the economic 
arguments depend on whether any of those awards can be labeled 
compensatory.  From the standpoint of modern economics, the analysis 
is instrumental all the way down, so the concept of compensation does 
no meaningful work. 
II.  SOME EARLY SIMILARITIES 
Let me begin with the earlier analyses, which suggested that the most 
efficient remedies would indeed correspond to relatively simple notions 
of compensation.  I describe below the analysis developed for remedies for 
breach of contract, because that is the field with which I am most 
familiar.  But similar analyses were also applied to remedies in tort law 
and property, so I will occasionally refer to those fields as well. 
A.  Efficient Breach and Efficient Performance 
Suppose, then, that A has contracted to sell a unique widget to B for 
$200.  Suppose further that B plans to put the widget to some use which 
is worth $250 to him.  But suppose that there is a third buyer, C, who 
wants the widget for some more urgent purpose in which the widget 
would be worth $300 to C. 
1.  Permitting Efficient Breaches; Deterring Inefficient Ones 
Most economic analyses start with the premise that, on the facts as 
stated, it would be efficient for the widget to end up in the hands of C  
 
 2. L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 
1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 54 (1936) [hereinafter Fuller & Purdue I); L.L. Fuller & William R. 
Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 2, 46 YALE L.J. 373 (1937). 
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because the widget is worth more to C than it is to B.3  Obviously, the 
soundness of this premise depends on what the numbers in the above 
example represent, and in what sense the widget is “really” worth $250 
to B or $300 to C.  I will return to this issue below, when I discuss the 
implications this analysis might have for how compensation should be 
measured. 
For now, though, let us accept the premise that an efficient outcome 
requires the widget to end up being used by C.  What the earliest 
economic analyses showed is that a remedy giving B $250 for the loss of 
the widget—“expectation damages,” in contract parlance—should in fact 
lead the widget to end up in C’s hands.  That is, if A will have to pay 
$250 in damages if she fails to deliver the widget to B, this means that A 
will have no interest in breaking her contract unless C offers to pay more 
than $250.  Otherwise, A would get less from C than she would have to 
pay in damages, so the breach would not be profitable for A. 
Fortunately, if the widget is actually worth $300 to C, then C should 
be willing to pay A more than $250 for the widget, and A should be 
willing to accept.  In that event, A will keep whatever amount C pays in 
excess of $250 (since A must pay $250 over to B in damages).  Meanwhile, 
C will end up profiting as long as C pays A less than $300 for the 
widget, because the widget is worth a full $300 to C.  In the end, then, A 
and C should agree on a price somewhere between $250 and $300; A 
will then deliver the widget to C, and B will collect $250 in damages.  
As this leaves the widget in the hands of C—which is just where we said 
it was efficient for the widget to end up—this analysis came to be known 
as the “theory of efficient breach.”4 
Of equal importance, the early analyses showed that a $250 remedy 
also produced the desirable effect of deterring inefficient breaches.  
Suppose, for example, that instead of C we have a third buyer, D, to 
whom the widget is worth only $150.  Because the widget is worth less 
to D than it is to B (recall that B values the widget at $250), this means it 
would be inefficient for the widget to end up in D’s hands.  But this 
should never happen, as long as A has to pay $250 in damages if she 
breaks her contract with B.  That is, if the widget is worth only $150 to 
D, there is no price D would be willing to pay that would cover A’s 
 
 3. For early versions of this analysis, see Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of 
Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273 (1970); 
John H. Barton, The Economic Basis of Damages for Breach of Contract, 1 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 277 (1972). 
 4. As I discuss in Part II.B, there may be other remedies that will also lead to this 
efficient outcome, especially if the parties can easily renegotiate.  For now, the only 
claim of interest is a nonexclusive one: that compensatory damages are one remedy that 
can move the widget to its most efficient destination. 
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damage liability, so A should simply decline D’s offer and deliver the 
widget to B.  In this way, damages of $250 should permit efficient 
breaches while deterring inefficient breaches. 
2.  Defining “Compensatory” Damages 
In this example, the efficient remedy ($250) could also be labeled a 
“compensatory” remedy.  That is, a $250 award gives B the exact 
amount that the widget would have been worth to him.  Thus, this award 
can easily be described as compensating B for the loss of that widget. 
Indeed, from an economic standpoint, the efficient damage award 
should reflect the widget’s actual, subjective value to B.  To be sure, in a 
corrective justice theory, it might not be obvious whether “compensation” 
should mean compensating B for the market value of his loss, or for his 
lost subjective value, or for some other value entirely.  From an 
efficiency standpoint,  however—at least to the extent that our goal is 
deterring inefficient breaches while permitting efficient ones—B’s 
subjective value will usually be the most efficient measure. 
For example, suppose that the widget has a market value of only $50, 
but B nevertheless values it at $250, perhaps because B is a passionate 
collector of widgets, who needs this one to complete his collection.  
Those who think economists care only about market value might expect 
that economic analysis would then identify $50 as the truly 
compensatory remedy.  In fact, though, the early economic analysts—
insofar as they were focused on the goal of deterring inefficient 
breaches—identified $250 as the remedy best suited to serve that goal.  
That is, if B will suffer a $250 loss if he fails to receive the widget, 
economists argued that it would be inefficient to give the widget to 
someone else, unless that someone else would lose even more than $250 
if he failed to receive the widget.5  From this standpoint, a $50 remedy 
would be too low, for that would allow A to breach the contract and sell 
 
 5. See, e.g., Donald Harris et al., Contract Remedies and the Consumer Surplus, 
95 LAW Q. REV. 581, 585, 609 (1979); Timothy J. Muris, Cost of Completion or 
Diminution in Market Value: The Relevance of Subjective Value, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 379, 
400 (1983).  As Richard Posner has put it:
 
If I refuse to sell for less than $250,000 a house that no one else would pay 
more than $100,000 for, it does not follow that I am irrational, even if no 
“objective” factors such as moving expenses justify my insisting on such a 
premium.  It follows only that I value the house more than other people. This 
extra value has the same status in economic analysis as any other value. 
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.7, at 55 (6th ed. 2003). 
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the widget to someone like D who values it far less than B does. 
Another difference between the economic and the corrective justice 
analyses is that it is unnecessary, under an economic approach, to decide 
whether B actually owns the widget in order to identify $250 as the 
efficient remedy.  To be sure, if compensation were defined as 
compensation for loss of ownership, as it easily might be under a 
corrective justice theory, we would first have to decide what B owns 
before we could decide what compensation was due.  As Fuller and 
Perdue pointed out long ago, we cannot simply assume that B owns the 
right to the widget, without some justification for that assumption.  For 
example, if we were to start instead with the premise that B owns 
merely the right not to be made worse off by A’s having contracted 
with him, B might then be entitled (under a corrective justice theory) 
only to compensation for his reliance damages.6 
Significantly, though, the instrumental or “efficient breach” analysis 
sidesteps this question of ownership.  If B values the widget at $250, and 
D values it at only $150, then it is efficient for the widget to end up in 
B’s hands, whether or not we say that B actually owned the widget.  In 
fact, even if B did not own the widget, it would still be efficient for the 
widget to end up in B’s hands, as long as the widget is truly worth more 
to B than to D.7  For example, even if B and D had no contractual 
dealings at all, and even if neither had any moral claim to A’s widget, 
we would still reach an efficient outcome (meaning that the widget 
would be transferred to B and not to D) if A were suddenly under an 
obligation to pay B $250 in damages if she for any reason refused to 
make that transfer. 
To be sure, there may be other economic reasons not to place A under 
such an obligation, especially if A and B are complete strangers with no 
contractual dealings.  But the only claim of the efficiency analysis is a narrow 
one—to wit, that among the effects produced by such an obligation 
would be the economically desirable effect of making sure the widget 
ends up at its most efficient destination.  More specifically, the claim is 
that this will be the effect if damages for breach of the obligation are set 
at $250 or however much the widget is actually worth to B. 
In short, the goal of the early instrumental theories, at least in the form 
under consideration here, was to encourage A to break the contract only 
if there was another buyer who would, in fact, get more value from the 
widget than B would get from it.  One way to encourage those breaches, 
 
 6. Fuller & Perdue I, supra note 2, at 62–63. 
 7. As Daniel Friedmann has noted, the instrumental effects identified in the 
analysis of efficient breach could also be produced by employing merely compensatory 
remedies in any case involving “efficient theft.”  Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach 
Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1989). 
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while simultaneously discouraging any others, was to require A to pay 
strictly compensatory damages if he failed to deliver the widget to B.  To 
best achieve the instrumental goal of the theory, the most efficient 
measure of damages was whatever value B would, in fact, have gotten 
from the widget.  Finally, that measure of damages would be the 
efficient one whether or not it happened to coincide with any definition 
of “compensation” for B’s loss. 
B.  Liability Rules and Efficient Takings 
At about the same time, a similar analysis developed in connection 
with takings and nuisances in the law of real property.  The classic article 
here, of course, is Calabresi and Melamed’s examination of property and 
liability rules.8  “Property rules,” in Calabresi and Melamed’s terms, 
trigger injunctive remedies against violators, so that portion of their 
analysis is less relevant to the topic of compensation (though I will 
return to this issue later, in Part III.G).  For now, the key point is that 
Calabresi and Melamed’s analysis of liability rules rested on arguments 
that were very similar to the early analyses of efficient breach. 
1.  Damages Under Liability Rules 
Specifically, suppose that a factory is deciding whether to emit 
pollution that would reduce the quality of life enjoyed by surrounding 
landowners.  An economic analysis would ask how much the factory 
could gain by polluting, and how much the surrounding landowners 
would lose.  Indeed, an efficiency analysis (insofar as it focused solely 
on the decision to pollute) would begin with the premise that the factory 
should emit the pollution if, but only if, the gain to the factory exceeded 
the loss to the landowners.  This is exactly parallel to the premise of the 
efficient breach theory, which said that the widget should be delivered to 
C if and only if the gain C would get from the widget exceeded the loss 
that B would suffer. 
Once this is seen, the rest of the argument follows easily.  If the factory is 
required to pay damages that exactly equal the surrounding landowners’ 
losses, the factory will then have no incentive to pollute unless its gains 
from polluting exceed the landowners’ losses.  In that case, though, it 
 
 8. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
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is actually efficient for the factory to pollute, so this outcome fulfills 
the instrumental goal.  If, instead, the factory were to gain less from 
polluting than the landowners would lose, then it would not be 
efficient to pollute.  But in that case, the threat of damages equal to 
the landowners’ losses should deter the factory from polluting—which is 
just as it ought to do, if polluting would not be efficient. 
In addition, this analysis had similar implications for exactly how the 
landowners’ losses should be measured.  That is, just as in the contracts 
example, efficient incentives in these models could be achieved by setting 
the damages equal to the actual losses the landowners suffer—meaning, 
in this case, the difference between (a) the landowners’ quality of life 
without the pollution, and (b) their quality of life if the factory polluted.  
Granted, this reduction may be difficult to measure, for market values 
may be as irrelevant in this example as they were to the passionate widget 
collector.  Conceptually, though, the instrumental analysis gave a clear 
answer to the question of what the law should try to measure.  And this 
instrumental answer—unlike the answers provided by corrective 
justice—did not depend on any prior decision as to whether the 
landowners already owned the right to be protected against this loss. 
2.  Damages Under Property Rules 
Of course, Calabresi and Melamed went on to contrast this method of 
calculating damages with the protection provided by what they called a 
“property rule.”9  For example, under a property rule, the factory might 
be prohibited from polluting unless it offered the landowners enough 
money to pollute.  Calabresi and Melamed pointed out that this rule might 
also produce efficient outcomes, for the factory would not be willing to 
offer enough money to get the landowners’ permission unless the 
factory’s gain from polluting did, in fact, exceed the landowners’ losses. 
Significantly (for our purposes), efficient outcomes under a property 
rule do not require the use of compensatory damages.  Under a property 
rule, all that matters is that the damages be large enough to deter the 
factory from polluting without having first secured the landowners’ 
permission.  As a result, efficient outcomes under a property rule could be 
achieved with much larger measures of damages, including injunctive 
relief (backed by fines for contempt) or even criminal sanctions.  In this 
respect, the early analyses of takings and nuisances did not imply that 
compensatory remedies were the only way that efficiency could be 
achieved. 
Indeed, much the same point was quickly made about the desirability 
 
 9. Id. at 1089–93. 
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of compensatory damages in contract law.  That is, while compensatory 
damages might be one way to create efficient incentives to perform or 
breach, efficient incentives might also be created by property rules if the 
remedy of specific performance were made freely available.10  Like an 
injunction in property law, specific performance requires the would-be 
breacher to perform the contract unless the other party agrees to permit 
the breach, perhaps upon payment of some fee.  And if the breach is 
efficient—meaning that the gains to the breaching party exceed the 
losses to the nonbreacher—then the breacher should be willing and able 
to offer the nonbreacher more than the performance would have been 
worth, in which case the two parties should agree to permit the breach.  
Such payments are the exact analog, in contract law, of the payments 
that might be offered by the factory to the surrounding landowners, if the 
landowners were protected by a property rule.11 
In short, almost as soon as the first efficiency arguments were 
formulated, qualifications and complexities began to appear.  Indeed, 
these complexities (as well as many others) form the basis of my 
discussion of the more recent analysis in Part III of this paper.  Before 
proceeding to that discussion, though, two other early instrumental goals 
must be introduced.  As we will see, the damage measures that were 
most efficient at serving those goals were also easy to characterize as 
“compensatory” damages. 
C.  Precautions Against Probabilistic Injuries 
Suppose now that A is a manufacturer deciding whether to spend 
money on better quality control, to reduce the risk of a defect in her 
product.  At present, there is a 10% chance that any product A sells will 
be defective, but if she adopts the more expensive system of quality 
control, the chance of a defect will be eliminated.  To make the example 
more concrete, let us suppose that each time there is a defect, A’s 
 
 10. For an early analysis cast in exactly these terms, see Anthony T. Kronman, 
Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351 (1978).  These arguments were further 
developed in Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271 
(1979), and in Thomas S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a 
Unified Theory of Contract Remedies, 83 MICH. L. REV. 341 (1984). 
 11. For discussions of this sort of renegotiation in connection with contract 
remedies more generally, see (in addition to the articles cited supra note 10) Ian R. 
Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REV. 947 (1982); 
Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 629 (1988). 
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customers lose value equal to $200, either through being injured 
physically or from having a less functional product.  In the first case, if 
physical injury is involved, A might be liable under tort law.  In the second 
case, A might be liable under contract law for breach of warranty—but 
in either case, the economic analysis will be much the same.12 
From an efficiency standpoint, A should spring for the better quality 
control system if the benefits from doing so (fewer defects) exceed the 
costs.  If $200 is really an accurate measure of how much her customers 
lose from each defect—more on this in Part III—then reducing those 
losses by 10% can be thought of as saving each customer $20 in 
expected value (0.10 x $200 = $20).  If we further suppose that A’s 
customers are risk-neutral, then they will evaluate these savings in 
precisely those terms: They would willingly pay up to $20 to eliminate 
all risk of a defect.  If so, then the most efficient outcome is for A to 
adopt the better system of quality control system if, but only if, it costs 
her less than $20 per product.  Significantly, this is exactly what A will 
have an incentive to do, if the legal system requires her to pay $200 in 
damages for each and every defect.13  If A does not spend more money 
on quality control, we have already said that her products will be 
defective 10% of the time, and each defect will injure her customers by 
$200.  As a result, A will have to pay $200 on 10% of her sales, which 
works out to the equivalent of paying $20 per sale.  By contrast, if A 
spends the additional money on quality control, we have said that none 
of her products will be defective, so she will not have to pay anything in 
damages.  This means that A can profit by installing the better quality 
control and eliminating her legal liability if, but only if, the better quality 
control costs less than $20 per product. 
As a result, A’s incentives are now exactly in line with the conditions 
under which better quality control would be more efficient.  In other 
words, a damage measure set equal to the victims’ actual losses—$200, 
in this example—should give potential defendants an incentive to take 
the efficient level of precautions against accidental injury, as well as 
giving them an incentive not to deliberately commit inefficient acts (as 
 
 12. The similarities and differences (from an economic standpoint) are nicely 
described in Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 
73 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1985). 
 13. For a formal model of this incentive in connection with contract remedies, see 
Lewis A. Kornhauser, Reliance, Reputation, and Breach of Contract, 26 J.L. & ECON. 
691 (1983).  The analogous argument in tort law—that strict liability can give potential 
tortfeasors an incentive to take an efficient level of precautions, if the measure of 
damages is set so that the tortfeasor internalizes all of her victims’ losses—goes back 
even earlier.  See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 68–94 (1970). 
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discussed in the two preceding sections).14  Given this similarity in the 
outcomes of these different strands of economic analysis, it is hardly 
surprising that many scholars came to believe that compensatory damages 
were generally efficient. 
Moreover, the economic analysis of probabilistic injury also had 
implications for how “compensatory” damages should be defined, just as 
it did in the preceding sections.  That is, as long as A and her customers 
are risk-neutral, A’s incentives will be efficient only if the damages she 
pays are tied to the actual losses her customers suffer, if and when a 
product is defective.  This remains true even if some of those losses are 
purely intangible (for example, if the defective widget doesn’t quite 
match the other ones in B’s living room), or even if the losses are not 
strictly related to anything in A’s contract with B (for example, the 
defect causes B to become dissatisfied with the entire idea of collecting 
widgets, so what was once a source of great pleasure to him now seems 
hollow and empty).  As long as these are losses that B would not have 
suffered if the widget had not been defective, then they are losses that 
will be affected by A’s decision concerning quality control.  From an 
efficiency standpoint, therefore, these are losses that A ought to consider 
when making her decision. 
To be sure, there may be other reasons or other instrumental goals that 
counsel in the opposite direction, suggesting that some of these losses 
should not be included in the measure of damages.  Many of these reasons 
will be discussed later, in Part III of the paper.  For now, the only 
relevant point is a narrow one: In the simplest analysis of the incentive 
to take precautions, one way to create efficient incentives is to include 
all resulting losses in the legal measure of damages. 
D.  Damages as Efficient Insurance 
Finally, there is one other instrumental goal that might also be 
achieved by compensatory damages, at least in the simplest economic 
models.  If some probability of an injury will always remain, in spite of 
A’s precautions, potential victims such as B may want insurance against 
those injuries.  And if B is risk-averse but A is not—and if private insurance 
 
 14. If A’s customers will always be fully informed of any risks associated with her 
product, this may give A a market incentive to produce better products regardless of 
whether the law makes her pay any damages for defects.  In order to focus on the effect 
of different damage measures, I make the standard assumption that A’s customers are not 
perfectly informed about the risks her products pose. 
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against such losses is for some reason unavailable—compensatory 
damages may provide exactly the efficient level of insurance. 
The analysis here is straightforward.15  To say that a party is “risk-
averse” is to say that she would prefer to eliminate any risk of 
fluctuations in her welfare, even if she had to pay something to do so.  
By contrast, a party who is “risk-preferring” would be happier with a 
50% chance of a large gain, even if that meant also accepting a 50% 
chance of a large loss.  And a party who is “risk-neutral” would be 
equally happy with either of those options—either a sure thing, with no 
risk of fluctuation whatsoever; or an evenly-balanced chance between a 
large gain and an equally large loss. 
While any of these attitudes toward risk is of course possible, cases 
involving risk-averse victims provide an additional justification for 
compensatory damages.  If a risk-averse victim faces, say, a 10% risk 
that some product will turn out defective, but if the victim can then be 
given a legal remedy that will prevent her from suffering any loss in 
welfare (once the remedy is paid), that remedy will have effectively 
eliminated any risk of suffering a loss.  In fact, if the remedy could truly 
offset any loss in welfare, it would guarantee that the victim achieves the 
same welfare no matter what happens: either she will get a functioning 
product, or she will get the equivalent in the form of a legal remedy. 
This guarantee of a fixed level of welfare is precisely what a risk-
averse victim will prefer.  By contrast, any higher or lower remedy 
would leave the victim facing some ups or downs in her potential 
welfare (potential ups, in the case of higher remedies; or potential downs, 
in the case of lower ones).  Thus, the analysis of victims’ attitudes 
toward risk cannot only provide a potential justification for compensatory 
damages; it can also answer the question of how “compensation” should 
be defined.  To achieve this particular instrumental goal—the goal of 
providing the level of insurance that risk-averse victims would 
want—compensatory damages should be set as close as possible to the 
level that would truly make the victim indifferent between (a) not 
suffering the wrong in the first place and (b) suffering the wrong but 
collecting damages. 
In summary, at the time these early economic analyses were 
 
 15. For a more systematic treatment of these issues, see A. Mitchell Polinsky, Risk 
Sharing Through Breach of Contract Remedies, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 427 (1983).  For 
simplicity, my discussion in the text will assume that the wrongdoing party is risk-
neutral.  However, the general character of the analysis—though not the specific 
conclusions—would remain much the same even in the more complex case in which the 
wrongdoing party was risk-averse as well.  Risk aversion on the part of wrongdoers will 
be briefly considered infra at note 51, in connection with the effect on optimal 
enforcement. 
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developed—around 1980 or so—it might have seemed obvious that 
compensatory damages were efficient.  In addition, it might also have 
seemed that economic analysis could answer the difficult second-order 
questions about how compensatory damages ought to be calculated or 
defined (namely, by setting damages at a level that would make victims 
subjectively indifferent to whether the wrong took place or not).  As a 
consequence, it might well have seemed that instrumental analysts and 
corrective justice theorists shared a good deal of common ground. 
III.  THE PARTING OF THE WAYS 
But that was then, and this is now.  As I describe below, economic 
analyses produced during the last fifteen or twenty years have 
significantly softened the earlier conclusion that compensatory remedies 
were necessarily efficient. 
To be sure, this is not to say that compensatory remedies are never 
efficient.  The older models remain valid within their limits, and in many 
cases the remedies those models identified may well be the most 
efficient ones.  What it does mean, though, is that the analysis is 
necessarily more complicated than it once was. 
In particular, recent analyses have emphasized that there are many 
different instrumental goals to be served, and the remedy that is most 
efficient in serving one goal might not be most efficient in serving 
another.  To use the economic jargon, there are many different 
“margins” along which parties might adjust their behavior, and different 
remedies may have different effects along each of those margins.  Thus, 
even if it is possible to identify the remedy that is unquestionably 
efficient in its effect on one particular consequence, that same remedy 
may not be the one that optimizes other consequences.  As I said at the 
outset, this complicates the analysis considerably. 
To better illustrate this point, each of the following sections will 
consider a different consequence (or a different margin).  Specifically, 
the first section surveys the efficiency of the insurance provided by 
different remedies.  The next two sections discuss the efficiency of the 
incentives that each remedy creates for victims to adjust their own 
behavior.  The fourth and fifth sections focus on the incentives that 
remedies create for the potential wrongdoer, either to take precautions to 
reduce the risk of a probabilistic harm, such as the harm caused by a 
defective product; or to take any of several precautions before a contract 
has even been signed.  The sixth section considers the efficient level of 
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enforcement costs, and the effects that imperfect enforcement might 
have on the size of the most efficient remedy.  Finally, the last section 
returns to the example with which I began, by considering the effect of 
remedies on a wrongdoer’s incentives to refrain from a nonprobabilistic 
injury, such as a deliberate breach of contract or a deliberate taking. 
A.  Efficient Insurance 
I begin, though, with more recent analyses of efficient insurance.  In 
Part II.D of this paper, I considered the example of a manufacturer 
whose products posed a 10% risk of a defect, where the defect (if it 
occurred) would cause users of the product to lose $200.  In particular, I 
suggested that risk-averse users would want an insurance policy that 
compensated them for the full amount of their loss ($200).  If private 
insurance were for any reason unavailable, it might then be efficient for 
the law to provide such insurance in the form of a fully compensatory 
damage remedy—if users of the product were risk-averse. 
But what if users are not risk-averse?  If users are instead risk-
preferring, then (by definition) they would rather go without full 
insurance.  By going without full insurance, risk-preferring users gain a 
chance of a greater benefit if the product they buy is not defective, for in 
that case they will get full use of the product without having to pay 
insurance premiums.  True, users who go this route are also accepting 
the risk of a smaller benefit (or even an outright loss) if the product does 
turn out to be defective, for in that case they will not have insurance to 
cushion their losses.  By definition, though, a risk-preferring user will 
happily accept the chance of a greater loss, in order to get the equal 
chance of a greater benefit.  Thus, to the extent that the law is trying to 
achieve efficient levels of insurance, damages should be less than fully 
compensatory when victims are risk-preferring. 
Granted, the practical significance of this example is limited, for there 
are probably few (if any) real-world situations in which most victims are 
risk-preferring.  There are, however, many other situations that have 
similar implications for the efficient level of insurance, and hence for the 
efficiency of undercompensatory remedies.  In particular, undercompensatory 
remedies may be efficient (insofar as the effect on insurance is 
concerned) when the loss is a nonpecuniary one that does not affect the 
victim’s monetary needs. 
Consider, for example, a couple whose wedding photographs are ruined 
by the negligence of the photographer.16  Let us stipulate that the loss of 
these photographs represents a real loss to the couple, perhaps a 
 
 16. Carpel v. Saget Studios, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 1331, 1332 (E.D. Pa. 1971). 
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substantial one.  If so, then the couple would likely want the photographer to 
spend a good deal on precautions to reduce the likelihood of such a loss. 
In this section, however, we are not considering the efficient level of 
precautions, but rather the efficient level of insurance.  (The effect of 
remedies on the photographer’s level of precautions will be taken up 
later, in Part III.D.)  And just because the couple might want lots of 
precautions to prevent this loss from occurring, it does not follow that 
the couple must also want an insurance policy that would pay them lots 
of money, if and when the loss did occur.  Instead, this couple might 
well prefer to be less than fully insured against the loss, which suggests 
that efficient levels of insurance might be achieved by less than fully 
compensatory damages.17 
The reason the couple might prefer less than full insurance stems from 
the relationship between insurance and the marginal utility of money.  
Most economists find it plausible to suppose that the marginal utility of 
money declines at higher levels of wealth, meaning that the last dollar a 
person has will be less valuable (to that person) than the first.  If so, then 
it is entirely rational for such a person to be risk-averse and to prefer full 
insurance against any calamity that would leave him with smaller 
amounts of money.  By buying full insurance, the person must settle for 
having somewhat less money in the event that he is lucky and no 
calamity occurs (in which case he will have paid the insurance premiums 
and gotten nothing for them).  The benefit, of course, is that full 
insurance guarantees that the person will have more money—more 
money, that is, than if he hadn’t purchased the insurance—in the event 
the calamity does strike. 
In effect, then, insurance allows a policyholder to transfer money 
away from some possible states of the world (those in which the 
calamity does not strike) and into other possible states of the world 
(those in which it does).  Significantly, such a transfer makes perfect 
sense if the states of the world in which the calamity strikes are also 
those in which the policyholder would have less money, because of the 
calamity’s pecuniary effects (hospital bills, repair costs, direct financial 
 
 17. The formal economic analysis of this issue is due to Philip J. Cook & Daniel 
A. Graham, The Demand for Insurance and Protection: The Case of Irreplaceable 
Commodities, 91 Q.J. ECON. 143 (1977).  Applications of this analysis to legal issues 
include Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Nonpecuniary Loss and Breach of Contract, 11 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 35 (1982); Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical 
Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353 (1988). 
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losses, etc.).  That is, if the marginal utility of money truly is greater 
when the policyholder has less of it, it makes perfect sense for the 
policyholder to want to give up some money in states where he has more 
of it, in order to receive more money in states where he has less.  This is 
why risk-averse policyholders should want insurance policies that fully 
compensate them against any pecuniary losses. 
However, the logic of this argument simply does not apply to 
insurance against nonpecuniary losses, such as the couple’s loss of their 
wedding pictures.  If their pictures are destroyed, the couple may feel 
that the quality of their life is now poorer, but they will still have just as 
much money as they would have had if this loss had been averted.  As a 
result, there is no reason to think that money will have a greater marginal 
value to the couple in this state of the world (the state in which their 
pictures are destroyed) than in any other state.  This implies that there is 
no reason for the couple to want an insurance policy that would give 
them more money if and when their pictures are destroyed, if the same 
policy would also leave them with less money (because of the insurance 
premiums) whenever their pictures turn out fine.  In other words, if the 
success or failure of the couple’s wedding pictures has no effect on their 
need for money, why would they want their insurance or other financial 
policies to depend on the presence or absence of their wedding pictures? 
Put more simply, the problem here is that insurance cannot restore the 
lost pictures, but can only replace them with money.  If there were a way 
of restoring the pictures themselves, the couple might well want to pay 
for an insurance policy that would give them the replacements. But to 
purchase an insurance policy that pays off only in cash, and does not 
replace the actual pictures, is simply to make a financial gamble: It is a 
bet that pays off with more money in some states of the world and less 
money in other states.  While people who like gambles may be attracted 
to such a policy—people who like to gamble are “risk-preferrers,” in 
economic jargon—there is no reason for couples who are risk-averse to 
be so attracted.18 
To be sure, many losses with which the law is concerned inflict both 
 
 18. At least, there is no reason for such couples to be attracted to a contract 
remedy that provides full insurance, for (as a first approximation) they will have to pay 
the “premiums” for that insurance in the form of a higher price for their photographs. 
Insurance provided by way of tort remedies produces more complex distributional 
effects, at least in torts between parties who lack any contractual relationship.  In those 
cases, the insurance will not have to be paid for in the form of a higher contract price, so 
the provision of extra insurance represents a kind of subsidy to potential victims.  An 
analogous point remains, though: If the loss is a nonpecuniary one, risk-averse victims 
would prefer to receive the equivalent subsidy in the form of a simple cash transfer, 
rather than in the form of a lottery ticket that gives them extra money only if their 
wedding pictures happen to be destroyed. 
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pecuniary and nonpecuniary costs.  An auto accident may leave the 
victim with a great deal of pain and suffering (which is usually a 
nonpecuniary cost); but it will also leave the victim with medical bills (a 
pecuniary cost), and having to pay those bills will surely increase the 
marginal value of money.  Indeed, even a seemingly nonpecuniary cost, 
like the loss of wedding pictures, could have pecuniary implications if 
(for example) the loss was so devastating that the couple had to seek 
expensive therapy.  As should be apparent from the discussion above, 
the classification of a loss as pecuniary or nonpecuniary does not turn on 
anything intrinsic to the loss itself.  Instead, that classification turns 
entirely on the effect of the loss on the victim’s marginal utility of 
money.  More specifically, it turns on whether the victim’s best response 
to the loss—whether that involves going to a hospital, going into 
therapy, or doing nothing at all—increases the marginal utility of money 
to the victim, relative to the marginal utility that money would have if 
the loss had never been suffered. 
In short, whenever nonpecuniary losses are involved, there is an 
argument that damages should be less than fully compensatory, insofar 
as we are concerned with providing efficient levels of insurance.  To be 
sure, efficient levels of insurance are not the only thing that matters to 
efficiency, and subsequent sections will consider the ways in which this 
conclusion must be altered once other instrumental goals are taken into 
account.  Even before we get to those other goals, however, the basic 
point should be clear.  The argument that economic efficiency requires 
fully compensatory damages does not apply as widely, and is certainly 
not as simple, as was once believed. 
B.  Efficient Behavior by the Victim 
The preceding section considered the effect of remedies on the level of 
insurance that victims effectively received.  But legal remedies (or their 
absence) can also affect victims’ actual behavior, including behavior that 
might either contribute to or mitigate the effects of the wrongdoer’s 
behavior.  For example, if contracting parties were assured full 
compensation for all of their losses, no matter how foolishly they 
behaved, they might then have an incentive to take extra risks (secure in 
the knowledge they would be compensated),19 or to run up their damages 
 
 19. In the technical economics literature, the form of victim behavior that is most 
often analyzed is the victim’s decision about how heavily to invest in a contractual 
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needlessly by continuing to perform after the other party has already 
announced its breach.  Similarly, in tort cases we might worry about the 
effect of legal remedies on the victim’s incentive not to commit 
contributory negligence, or the victim’s incentive not to assume 
unnecessary risks. 
1.  Ways of Influencing Victims’ Behavior 
Of course, there are many ways in which the law might alter victims’ 
incentives.  For example, under the traditional contributory negligence 
rule in tort law, victims who were found to have behaved “unreasonably” 
were denied any recovery at all.  The mitigation requirement in contract 
law is in some respects similar, as it reduces the damages paid to victims 
who behave unreasonably after the breach.  These doctrines are similar 
in that each requires the court to evaluate the victim’s actual behavior, 
and each imposes a sanction, in the form of reduced recovery, only on 
those victims whose behavior is found wanting.20 
Notice, though, that these doctrines involve extra administrative costs, 
by requiring courts to evaluate the victim’s behavior.  They may also 
introduce additional uncertainty, and additional risk of judicial error, 
by leaving it to courts to decide what kind of behavior is “reasonable.”  
For these reasons, it may sometimes be easier to influence victims’ 
incentives by reducing the damages paid to all victims, without any 
inquiry into whether any particular victim behaved reasonably.  In 
effect, such a rule would be a form of strict liability on victims, making 
victims bear the loss whether or not they have behaved reasonably.  
Such a rule would also resemble the deductibles or coinsurance 
payments that are often found in private insurance plans.21  For 
example, if all victims were limited in their recovery to 80% of truly 
compensatory damages, that would leave victims bearing 20% of their 
losses.  As a result, victims would then have some incentive to moderate 
their own behavior, in order to reduce their chances of getting stuck 
with the uncompensated 20%. 
 
relationship, if some or all of that investment might be rendered worthless should the 
contract be breached.  See, e.g., Tai-Yeong Chung, Incomplete Contracts, Specific 
Investments, and Risk Sharing, 58 REV. ECON. STUD. 1031 (1991); Aaron S. Edlin & 
Stefan Reichelstein, Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment, 86 
AM. ECON. REV. 478 (1996); Yeon-Koo Che & Donald B. Hausch, Cooperative 
Investments and the Value of Contracting, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 125 (1999). 
 20. For a useful discussion of this aspect of rules that scrutinize victims’ behavior, 
see Cooter, supra note 12, at 10–11. 
 21. For an argument drawing on this analogy, see Richard A. Epstein, Beyond 
Foreseeability: Consequential Damages in the Law of Contract, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 105, 
118–20 (1989). 
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Of course, there is no reason to suppose that 80% would always be the 
right number.  If the remedy were instead reduced to (say) 40% of 
compensatory damages, meaning that victims had to bear 60% of their 
losses, that would give victims even stronger incentives to moderate 
their behavior.  We could even go farther and reduce damages all the 
way to zero, so that victims had to bear all of their losses—and in that 
case, victims would have exactly the right incentive to moderate their 
own behavior.  Under a zero-damages rule, victims’ incentives would be 
efficient because the victims would have to internalize all of the costs (as 
well as all of the benefits) of any changes in their own behavior. 
This analysis is complicated, though, by the fact that even victims who 
have the right incentives to moderate their behavior may not always have 
the ability to do so.  In particular, if victims are not very well informed 
about the relevant risks, or about the precautions available to reduce 
those risks, they may not know enough to modify their behavior 
appropriately, even if they have every incentive to do so (that is, even if 
the victims would have to bear all the resulting losses).  In many cases, if 
the wrongdoer has superior information about the relevant risks, it  
might make sense to shift the losses to victims only if the wrongdoer has 
disclosed that information.22 
2.  Victims’ Behavior and Other Relevant Incentives 
More generally, even when a lower measure of damages is efficient in 
one respect (namely, in its effect on victims’ incentives), it may not be 
efficient in others.  For example, a zero-damages rule might not provide 
 
 22. For these purposes, the disclosure of information can be viewed as an 
additional precaution that the wrongdoer should have taken, under the analysis to be 
discussed infra Part III.D.  In other contexts, it may be useful to require victims to 
disclose information to the potential wrongdoer, so that the wrongdoer can adjust her 
own precautions appropriately.  For an analysis of this latter possibility, see Lucian Ayre 
Bebchuk & Steven Shavell, Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of 
Contract: The Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 284 (1991). 
Of course, in either of these contexts, it may not be easy to figure out exactly what 
information should have been disclosed, or in what form it should have been disclosed.  
For discussions of this difficulty as it arises in products liability, see, for example, James 
A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The 
Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265 (1990); Howard Latin, “Good” 
Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1193 (1994).  
Some analogous issues in contract law are discussed briefly in Richard Craswell, 
Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related Doctrines, 60 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1, 53–57 (1993). 
CRASWELL.DOC 9/24/2019  10:03 AM 
 
1156 
the most efficient level of insurance, under the analysis discussed in the 
preceding subsection.  A lower measure of damages might also be 
inefficient in its effect on the wrongdoer’s incentives, under the analysis 
to be discussed in Part III.D.  As a consequence, lower measures of 
damages often will not represent the most efficient remedy overall, once 
all of the relevant effects are taken into account. 
Indeed, this tradeoff among different dimensions of efficiency will 
reappear at several points in this survey, for it exemplifies a recurring 
theme of the recent economic analysis.  That is, if instrumental analysis 
is concerned with behavior along more than one dimension, the remedy 
that is most efficient along all dimensions taken together will often be 
some intermediate value. 
As a consequence, some of the recent economic work has explored the 
effects of a more fundamental change in damages rules.  At present, in 
most fields of law, the entire sum that the wrongdoer pays in damages is 
awarded to the victim.  It is, however, possible to imagine a regime in 
which the wrongdoer pays more than the victim receives, with the 
difference being given to some third party (or simply paid into the public 
treasury as a fine).  Such a regime would, in effect, decouple the amount 
that the defendant pays from the amount that the plaintiff collects.  But 
this decoupling could be quite desirable from an efficiency standpoint, by 
permitting the use of two damage awards rather than one.  For example, 
the measure of damages that the wrongdoer was made to pay could be set 
with an eye to optimizing wrongdoers’ incentives to take precautions, 
while the measure of damages that the victim was allowed to collect could 
be set with an eye to optimizing the victim’s own incentives (or to 
optimizing victims’ insurance, as discussed in the preceding section).23 
Admittedly, decoupled damage regimes introduce administrative 
complexities of their own, including (for example) the need to police 
private settlements in which a defendant agrees to pay the plaintiff some 
amount without paying any additional sum to the public treasury.  Still, 
the fact that decoupled regimes could (in theory) have desirable efficiency 
consequences underscores even further the fact that “compensation,” as 
such, is not doing any of the work in economic analysis.  What matters 
in the modern analysis is that defendants be made to pay, and that 
 
 23. For economic analyses of “decoupled” damages, see, for example, Michael 
Spence, Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and Producer Liability, 44 REV. 
ECON. STUD. 561 (1977); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Yeon-Koo Che, Decoupling Liability: 
Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation, 22 RAND J. ECON. 562 (1991); Marcel 
Kahan & Bruce Tuckman, Special Levies on Punitive Damages: Decoupling, Agency 
Problems, and Litigation Expenditures, 15 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 175 (1995).  As these 
latter two articles address, decoupled damage regimes might also have implications for 
the frequency and cost of litigation, as discussed infra Part III.F. 
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plaintiffs be allowed to receive, some amount (not necessarily the same 
one) that will produce the best overall consequences.  Whether that 
amount also qualifies as compensatory is simply beside the point, as far as 
economic analysis is concerned. 
C.  Efficient Pricing and Levels of Activity 
One particular form of precaution, which is often available to victims, 
consists of reducing their use of some product or service.  That is, if a 
good or service carries some risk of harm, it is efficient to use that good 
or service only when the benefits from its use exceed the total costs, 
including the risk of any possible harms.  In the torts literature, this 
method of reducing overall risks is often referred to as reducing the 
victim’s “level of activity.”24 
Now, if there is no contractual relationship between victim and 
wrongdoer—more specifically, if the victim does not pay the wrongdoer 
any price for participating in the activity—the analysis is essentially 
identical to that given in the preceding section.25  That is, if victims are 
guaranteed full compensation for any loss, they will not have much 
incentive to reduce their participation in the activity, just as full 
compensation also reduces victims’ incentives to take other kinds of 
precautions.  By contrast, if victims are not fully compensated, they will 
then have more incentive to take their own steps to reduce the risk of 
harm, including (if appropriate) reducing their level of participation in 
the activity.  In the extreme case, if victims are not awarded any 
damages at all, they would then be internalizing all the costs associated 
with their choices, so their incentives to engage in the activity would be 
optimal.  However, victims might still need better information in order 
to respond optimally to these incentives; and in that case some 
disclosure requirement might be useful.26 
 
 24. Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2–3 (1980). 
 25. The only significant difference is that it is usually believed to be more difficult 
to use a contributory negligence standard to police a victim’s decisions regarding the 
level of activity than it is to use such a rule to police a victim’s decisions about levels of 
care.  Indeed, for purposes of this issue, the analytic distinction is not so much between 
“levels of activity” and “levels of care,” as it is between those decisions that can adequately 
be policed using a negligence-type standard and those that cannot.  Id. at 22–23. 
 26. See supra note 22. 
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1.  Prices and Enterprise Liability 
If, however, the victim must pay a price to the wrongdoer in order to 
engage in the activity, the analysis changes significantly.  In that case, 
even fully compensatory remedies could give victims an incentive to 
choose the appropriate level of participation.  After all, if the wrongdoer 
is fully liable for all losses generated by the activity, the wrongdoer’s 
prices must (in the long run) rise high enough to cover those losses.  
Higher prices, in turn, should usually discourage victims’ participation 
in the activity in question. 
Indeed, in some cases higher prices could create exactly the right 
incentives for victims (insofar as their level of activity is concerned), by 
forcing victims to pay a price reflecting the full costs associated with 
that activity.  Higher prices can have this effect even if victims are 
completely uninformed about the actual risks associated with the 
activity—instead, all that matters is that they be fully informed about the 
price they have to pay.27  As a result, whenever higher prices are a good 
method of discouraging participation in some activity, full compensatory 
damages might seem to produce yet another desirable effect.  In tort law, 
this effect has often been discussed under the heading of “enterprise 
liability.”28 
2.  Cross-Subsidization and Adverse Selection 
However, more recent economic analysis has limited this simple 
conclusion.  The analysis given above works fine when either (1) all 
users of the good or service are identical, or (2) (what is almost the same 
thing) sellers can charge each user a price that is precisely tailored to 
that user’s expected losses.  However, in many contexts users differ in 
the expected damages that a tort or a breach would inflict.  For example, 
if a defective toaster causes a fire, the consequential damages will be 
greater for users with expensive homes and furnishings than they will be 
for users with modest, working class homes.  And in many cases, the 
manufacturer of the toaster cannot easily charge different prices to 
 
 27. Shavell, supra note 24, at 14–16. 
 28. For the origins of this argument, see George L. Priest, The Invention of 
Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort 
Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 505–19 (1985).  More recent discussions include, for 
example, Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived 
Case for Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REV. 683, 693–94 (1993); James A. 
Henderson, Jr. & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Product-Related Risk and Cognitive Biases: The 
Shortcomings of Enterprise Liability, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 213 (2000); Jon D. 
Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: A Response to Market 
Manipulation, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 259 (2000). 
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different customers, so as to make each customer’s price reflect the total 
risks associated with his or her individual purchase. 
If manufacturers must instead charge all customers the same price for 
a given product, fully compensatory damages may then produce some 
less desirable effects.  If all customers pay the same price, the result will 
be a form of cross-subsidization.  Those users who are at risk for suffering 
the greatest losses, such as those with expensive home furnishings, will 
get the product at a subsidy because the price they pay will not be 
enough to cover all the potential losses that their purchase entails.  This 
subsidy will be paid for by users who have less at stake, and who 
therefore will receive less in damages if anything goes wrong, but who 
nevertheless have to pay the same price as the high-risk users do. 
Obviously, in this scenario, a price that reflects full compensatory 
remedies will no longer make each potential victim internalize all the 
costs associated with that particular victim’s product use.  Instead, in this 
scenario compensatory remedies can be criticized for producing two less 
desirable effects.  First, the direction of the subsidy may be undesirable 
from a fairness standpoint, if it allows relatively rich users to be 
subsidized by relatively poorer ones.29  Second, from the standpoint of 
efficient activity levels, the subsidy could produce “adverse selection,” 
meaning that riskier customers (those who benefit from the subsidy) will 
use the product excessively, while less risky customers (those who have 
to pay the subsidy) will use it too little.30  In the extreme case, the less 
risky customers might even be priced out of the market entirely, leaving 
only the highest-risk customers to purchase the product. 
To be sure, even if these effects occur, that need not imply that 
compensatory damages are necessarily bad.  As we have already seen, 
compensatory damages can produce any number of distinct effects, and 
some of these effects might be good while others might not be.  As a 
result, in any instrumental assessment of compensatory damages—or of 
any other damage remedy, for that matter—it will always be important 
to specify the precise instrumental effect that is being considered. 
 
 29. This effect has been noted by critics on both the left and the right.  See, e.g., 
Richard L. Abel, A Critique of American Tort Law, 8 BRIT. J.L. & SOC’Y 199, 202–06 
(1981); George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 
1297, 1350–51 (1981). 
 30. Gwyn D. Quillen, Note, Contract Damages and Cross-Subsidization, 61 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1131 (1988). 
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D.  Efficient Precautions by Wrongdoers 
Let us return now to the example of a manufacturer whose products 
pose a 10% risk of a defect, and a defect (if one occurs) inflicts a $200 
loss on users of the product.  For now, let us suppose this $200 loss is 
entirely pecuniary, to eliminate the complications discussed earlier in 
Part III.A; and let us also assume that there is nothing the victims can do 
to affect this risk.  But suppose now that improvements in technology 
make it possible to reduce the defect rate by one percentage point, from 
10% to 9%, by spending additional amounts on quality control.  When 
will that additional expenditure be efficient?  And what remedy will give 
the manufacturer an incentive to make that expenditure, if it is in fact 
efficient? 
If users of the product are risk-neutral, this small reduction in the 
defect rate should be worth $2 to them (0.01 x $200 = $2).  In that case, 
damages equal to $200 will give the manufacturer an incentive to take an 
efficient level of precautions, just as in the early analyses discussed in 
Part II.C.  That is, if the manufacturer has to pay $200 every time a 
product turns out defective, then extra expenditures on quality control 
will save the manufacturer $200 on liability on one out of every 100 
products produced, for an average savings of $2 per product.  As $2 also 
represents the benefit of improved quality control (to risk-neutral 
customers), the manufacturer’s incentives will reflect both the benefits 
and the costs of quality control. 
Moreover, even if users of the product are not risk-neutral, nothing 
changes in this analysis as long as the measure of damages fully 
compensates customers for all of their losses ($200).  After all, if the 
measure of damages is compensatory in this sense, then users of the 
product will not really be facing any risk.  Either there will be no defect, 
in which case they will not suffer any loss; or there will be a defect but 
they will be fully compensated, in which case they still will not suffer 
any loss.  As a result, users’ attitudes toward risk will be irrelevant in this 
example.  This means that the preceding paragraph’s conclusion—that it 
is efficient to spend up to $2 per product on improved quality control—can 
stand regardless of users’ attitudes toward risk, as long as damages are 
compensatory in this sense. 
However, complications arise when (a) users of the product are risk-
averse, and (b) the legal measure of damages is for some reason less than 
fully compensatory.  As we have already seen, there are several reasons 
(all having to do with other dimensions of efficiency) why legal 
remedies might properly be set at less than $200 here.  For example, 
smaller remedies might provide better levels of insurance against 
nonpecuniary losses; or they might improve the incentives of users of 
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the product, to the extent that users’ behavior could influence the likely 
losses.31  In such a case, use of a smaller remedy could also alter the 
efficient level of precautions by the wrongdoer, as long as victims are 
risk-averse. 
To see this, recall the numerical example I provided earlier, in which a 
reduction of the defect rate by one percentage point would be worth $2 
to users (0.01 x $200 = $2).  If users are risk-neutral, this is exactly how 
they will evaluate any reduction of one percentage point.  That is, to 
risk-neutral users, it will not matter whether the reduction is from 10% 
to 9%, or from 2% to 1%, or from 25% to 24%.  In any of these cases, 
risk-neutral users (by definition) will evaluate that reduction solely in 
terms of its expected value, which will always work out to $2. 
If users are risk-averse, however, they will not evaluate these 
reductions solely in terms of their average or expected value.  Instead, a 
risk-averse user might find a reduction from 25% to 24% to be worth 
somewhat more than a reduction from 10% to 9%, which may in turn be 
worth more than a reduction from 2% to 1%.  Indeed, such differences in 
valuation should be expected under the standard assumption of declining 
marginal utility.  In a nutshell, the user who faces a high risk of a defect 
(say, 25%) will have an expected level of wealth that is less than it 
would be if the user were instead facing a smaller risk of a defect (say, a 
risk of only 10%).  As a consequence, the first user might place a greater 
value on any improvement in his expected level of wealth than would 
the second user.  In practical terms, this means that risk-averse users 
might pay more to reduce the defect rate from 25% to 24%, than they 
would pay to reduce the defect rate from 10% to 9%.32 
As may already be apparent, this complicates the task of optimizing 
the manufacturer’s incentives.  Suppose, for concreteness, that users 
would pay $3 per product to reduce the risk from 25% to 24%, but they 
would only pay $2 per product to reduce the risk from 10% to 9%.  We 
have already seen that, if our goal is to get the manufacturer to spend up 
to $2 per product (but not to spend any more than that), damages set at 
 
 31. Subcompensatory remedies might also be desirable because of the effects of 
imperfect enforcement.  I discuss these effects infra Part III.E. 
 32. For a formal model incorporating this effect, see Rea, supra note 17, at 37–45.  
Survey evidence that is consistent with this effect is reported in M.W. Jones-Lee et al., 
The Value of Safety: Results of a National Sample Survey, 95 ECON. J. 49 (1985).  For 
more nuanced survey evidence, suggesting a more complex picture, see V. Kerry Smith 
& William H. Desvousges, An Empirical Analysis of the Economic Value of Risk 
Changes, 95 J. POL. ECON. 89 (1987). 
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$200 will achieve this goal. But if, instead, our goal is to get the 
manufacturer to spend up to $3 per product (and no more), damages 
should then be set at $300 for every defect.  That is, if damages are set at 
$300 per defect, then every reduction in the defect rate of one percentage 
point will reduce the manufacturer’s expected liability costs by exactly 
$3 (0.01 x $300 = $3).  Thus, insofar as the effect on the manufacturer’s 
precautions are concerned, the efficient damage measure will be $300 if 
we are considering precautions that reduce the defect rate from 25% to 
24%. But the efficient damage measure falls to $200 if we are 
considering precautions that instead would reduce the defect rate from 
10% to 9%, because users would only be willing to pay $2 rather than $3 
for that reduction. 
Once this is seen, the main point can be stated in ordinary English 
without using numbers.  Insofar as we are concerned with the wrongdoer’s 
incentive to take precautions, the efficient level of damages cannot 
necessarily be derived from the value that victims place on the entire 
loss they would suffer, as if they were being asked to accept that loss 
with certainty.  Instead, the efficient level of damages should be determined 
by first finding the value that victims place on the specific reduction in 
risk that is under consideration—since this is all the difference those 
precautions will actually make to the victims—and then working 
backwards from that value to come up with the damage measure that 
gives the manufacturer the correct incentives. 
In other words, the relevant economic question is not, “What is the 
value of a life?”  Instead, the relevant question is, “What is the value of a 
particular 1% reduction in the risk of losing one’s life?”  To be sure, 
when victims are risk-neutral (as the earlier models assumed), each of 
these questions should yield identical answers.  But when victims are 
risk-averse, and when they are not going to be fully compensated by the 
legal system, the answers to the two questions will no longer coincide.  
In that case, the most efficient measure of damages could be either 
higher or lower than the level that might otherwise be deemed 
compensatory. 
E.  Efficient Precontractual Investigation 
In contract law, one particular set of precautions (for which a different 
analysis is required) consists of steps that must be taken before any 
contract has been formed.  For example, we may want to give contracting 
parties an incentive not to misrepresent the quality of their products to 
prospective customers, or we may want incentives for parties to think 
carefully about a proposed contract before they sign.  To be sure, some 
precontractual behavior can be addressed directly without involving 
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breach of contract, as when misleading statements are punished in their 
own right under the law of fraud.  In many cases, though, the only 
sanction against inefficient precontractual behavior comes in the form of 
damages for breach, when the contract that was unwisely entered ends 
up broken.  In these cases, the selection of the remedy for breach may 
well have an effect on the incentives for precontractual behavior, so a 
full instrumental analysis must consider these effects as well. 
1.  Investigation of Potential Risks 
Consider, for example, a construction contract that turns out to be too 
costly for the builder to perform, but whose full costs could have been 
anticipated in advance if the builder had inspected the job site more 
carefully.  In other words, suppose that if the builder had made a more 
careful inspection, this contract would never have been signed. 
In such a case, the buyer cannot claim that the builder’s failure to 
inspect deprived him of the benefits he would have gotten from 
performance, for the buyer would not have gotten those benefits even if 
the builder had inspected (because if the builder had inspected, she 
would never have signed the contract).  However, the buyer may well be 
able to claim that, if the builder had made a more careful inspection, the 
buyer would have been able to save any money he spent in reliance on 
the builder’s promise that she would do the job.  Indeed, some analysts 
have suggested that the proper remedy in such case should be the 
buyer’s reliance damages, as these are the only losses that were truly 
caused (in a but-for sense of causation) by the builder’s inadequate 
inspection.33 
However, the full effects of damage remedies on the builder’s incentives 
are somewhat more complex.  When reliance damages are equal to 
expectation damages, as is often the case in perfectly competitive 
markets, the conclusion as stated is sound: Optimal incentives to 
investigate can be created by making anyone who breaches pay the other 
party’s reliance damages.  But if reliance damages are equal to expectation 
damages, it is just as true to say that efficient incentives could be created 
by making anyone who breaches pay the other party’s expectation 
damages.  The interesting cases, for purposes of this issue, are those in 
which reliance damages do not equal expectation damages.  These are 
 
 33. E.g., Christopher T. Wonnell, Expectation, Reliance, and the Two Contractual 
Wrongs, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 53, 77 (2001). 
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the cases in which the full economic analysis is more complex. 
Specifically, if the nonbreacher’s expectation damages exceed his 
reliance damages, this means that the breaching party (the builder in the 
above example) has not been able to capture all of the surplus from the 
proposed exchange.  As a consequence, the builder’s incentives may be 
distorted in two different ways.  First, the builder may fail to account for 
the fact that her inadequate investigation could lead the buyer into 
wasted reliance expenditures (just as the preceding analysis suggested).  
In addition, though, the builder may also fail to account for the surplus 
that the buyer would lose if, under threat of having to pay damages, the 
builder grows too conservative and declines to enter into some contracts 
that could profitably have been performed.34  A truly efficient damage 
measure would avoid distorting the builder’s incentives in either of these 
ways, and this will normally require a measure that exceeds the buyer’s 
reliance losses.  However, the optimal damage measure (in terms of its 
effect on the incentives to investigate) could be either above or below 
expectation damages, with the exact measure depending on the exact 
costs and benefits of further investigation.35 
2.  Search for Contracting Partners 
The analysis becomes even more complex if we consider the incentives 
governing another form of precontractual investigation, this time 
involving the search for potential contracting partners.  For example, if I 
have a widget I want to sell, I might sign a contract to sell it to the first 
buyer I find, or I might instead wait a bit longer to see if I can find 
someone who will pay an even higher price.  If I sign with the first buyer 
who appears, I save myself the costs of further search, but I also run the 
risk that I will later want to breach the contract (if another buyer arrives  
and offers to pay more for the widget).  In this respect, the additional 
search for contractual partners represents another form of precontractual 
precaution, to reduce the risk of entering into a contract that (in 
hindsight, at least) should not have been entered into. 
In this case, too, some of the complications arise from a kind of 
externality.  That is, if I decide to spend extra time searching for a better 
deal, I will capture some of the benefits of that search myself, assuming 
 
 34. For a formal model of these two effects, see Richard Craswell, Precontractual 
Investigation as an Optimal Precaution Problem, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 401 (1988). 
 35. Id. at 421–25.  More precisely, if the buyer knows the exact probability that the 
builder will be able to perform, then the actual risks can be reflected in the price the 
parties agree to, and any damage measure will give the builder optimal incentives to 
investigate.  If, instead, the buyer is not accurately informed about the relevant 
probabilities, only a damage measure in excess of the reliance measure will optimize the 
builder’s incentives to investigate. 
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my search is successful.  However, I will not necessarily capture all of 
the benefits from further search, because some of those benefits will 
likely be gained by the buyer that I eventually sell my widget to 
(assuming, again, that my search is successful).36  As a result of this 
latter effect, damages equal to the other party’s expectation interest may 
provide too little incentive for additional search.  But here, too, it is 
difficult to say whether the optimal measure of damages would be either 
higher or lower than the expectation measure, for this may depend on the 
exact structure of the costs and potential returns to search.37 
3.  Other Information Gathering 
More generally, there are many other forms of information gathering 
that might also be affected by legal remedies.  For instance, if one party 
goes to some trouble to learn that a war has ended, or to learn that there 
are valuable minerals under a farmer’s land, should the law require that 
party to disclose her information (for free) to anyone she later deals 
with?  As Anthony Kronman first emphasized, the answer to that 
question could significantly affect a party’s incentive to gather the 
information in the first place.38  Along the same lines, Victor Goldberg 
 
 36. More precisely, the searching party will capture all of the benefits only if she 
can sign a contract that extracts the entire surplus from any trading partner she discovers 
through additional search.  For formal models analyzing these incentives, see Peter A. 
Diamond & Eric Maskin, An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and Breach of Contract, I: 
Steady States, 10 BELL J. ECON. 282 (1979) [hereinafter Diamond & Maskin I]; P.A. 
Diamond & Eric Maskin, An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and Breach of Contract II. 
A Non-Steady State Example, 25 J. ECON. THEORY 165 (1981).  Some of the same 
features are present in Dale T. Mortensen, Property Rights and Efficiency in Mating, 
Racing, and Related Games, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 968, 973–75 (1982). 
 37. Diamond & Maskin I, supra note 36, at 288–300.  One complication stems 
from the fact that the optimal searching strategy for any one individual may depend on 
the searching strategy that other individuals follow, thus giving rise to multiple 
equilibria.  Still another complication, which Diamond and Maskin also take into 
account, rests on the fact that higher or lower measures of damages may also distort a 
party’s incentives when she is deciding to perform or breach a contract that she has 
already signed (as discussed earlier in connection with the theory of efficient breach). 
 38. Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of 
Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1978).  For a more formal economic analysis of this 
issue, see Steven Shavell, Acquisition and Disclosure of Information Prior to Sale, 25 
RAND J. ECON. 20 (1994).  Other, less formal discussions include Randy E. Barnett, 
Rational Bargaining Theory and Contract: Default Rules, Hypothetical Consent, the 
Duty to Disclose, and Fraud, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 783 (1992); Andrew Kull, 
Unilateral Mistake: The Baseball Card Case, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 57 (1992); Christopher 
T. Wonnell, The Structure of a General Theory of Nondisclosure, 41 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 329 (1991).  Analyses of the same issue from the standpoint of moral theory 
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has pointed out that the enforcement of fixed-price contracts can have a 
similar impact on parties’ incentives to invest time and money trying to 
forecast future price movements.39 
These problems, too, contain the key feature that the private incentives 
to gather information may not be the same as the social incentives.40  In 
many cases, information has social value because it allows people to 
alter their plans accordingly.  For example, if a war has in fact come to 
an end, it may now be worth planting crops again; while if there are 
valuable minerals under a plot of land, it may not be worth planting 
crops on it.  In each case, though, the information in question may also 
have private value, if it allows someone who knows the information to 
buy (or sell) the asset before its price changes.  In general, there is no 
reason why the social and private values should necessarily coincide, 
and therefore no reason why the private incentives to gather information 
will be optimal.41 
Admittedly, the implications of this issue for damage remedies may 
not be immediately apparent.  In much of contract law, and certainly in 
Anthony Kronman’s classic article, the question of interest is whether a 
seller should be allowed to rescind a contract if the buyer failed to 
disclose important information about the asset’s value.42  If the seller is 
allowed to rescind, the asset would then be returned to the seller—or, 
equivalently, if the asset has not yet been delivered, the seller would be 
allowed to refuse to deliver it.  In either case, the seller would then be 
free either to keep the asset, or to sell it on the market for its now higher 
market value.  The result, of course, is that the increase in value would 
then be captured by the seller rather than the buyer. 
 
include KIM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE 
COMMON LAW 111–26, 161–78 (1988); Alan Strudler, Moral Complexity in the Law of 
Nondisclosure, 45 UCLA L. REV. 337 (1997). 
 39. Victor P. Goldberg, Note on Price Information and Enforcement of the Expectation 
Interest, in READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 80–83 (Victor P. Goldberg 
ed., 1989). 
 40. This is a feature emphasized by Shavell, supra note 38, at 22.  For a less 
technical discussion of this aspect of the problem, see ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 258–61 (1988). 
 41. In particular, the extent of any divergence between private and social gains 
from gathering information will usually depend critically on how the gains from better-
informed decisions are divided between the contracting parties.  See, e.g., Shavell, supra 
note 38, at 23 (assuming that sellers can capture all of the gains by making “take it or 
leave it” offers); Diamond & Maskin I, supra note 36, at 286 (assuming an equal 
division of any surplus); Craswell, supra note 11, at 632–33 (assuming that the surplus is 
divided according to some fixed proportion). 
The expected division of any surplus is also a key parameter in assessing the effect of 
damage measures on the victim’s incentives to moderate his own behavior in reliance on 
a contract, as discussed in the text accompanying supra note 19. 
 42. Kronman, supra note 38. 
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Still, rescinding a contract (or excusing the seller from performing) is 
simply an extreme form of a less than compensatory remedy, for 
rescission denies the buyer any compensation for the seller’s failure to 
deliver.  Whenever Kronman’s argument is correct, then, it supplies an 
instrumental case for remedies that are less than fully compensatory.  To 
be sure, a corrective justice theorist might prefer to describe this as a 
case in which no wrong has been done (if the grant of rescission was 
proper), so no compensation is even required.  From an instrumental 
standpoint, however, there is no difference between saying “no wrong 
has been done” and saying “a wrong may have been done, but the most 
efficient remedy is zero damages.”  And in more nuanced models than 
Kronman’s, in which the optimal remedy is not zero (but may still be 
less than fully compensatory), saying that “no wrong has been 
committed” would lead to too low a remedy, at least if the absence of 
any “wrong” is taken to require no remedy at all. 
F.  Efficient Enforcement 
Yet another dimension of efficiency concerns the resources devoted to 
enforcing legal rights and remedies.  Perhaps in an ideal world of 
corrective justice, it would be the case that every wrong was instantly 
detected and every wrongdoer made to pay compensation.  In the real 
world, however, there is no way to attain this goal, at least not at any 
practicable cost.  As a result, recent economic analyses have devoted a 
good deal of attention to issues of optimal enforcement. 
1.  The Chance of Escaping Punishment 
For example, suppose that a particular wrong causes $200 of injury to 
its victims, and let us suppose for now that a $200 damage measure 
would create the right incentives for wrongdoers to avoid such losses.  
(In other words, to better focus in on issues involving enforcement costs, 
I shall ignore all of the complications discussed in the preceding three 
sections.)  To focus on enforcement issues, suppose that only 50% of 
those who commit these wrongs are ever sued and made to pay damages. 
In that case, it probably will not be efficient to charge those 
wrongdoers with exactly $200 in damages.  After all, if the wrongdoers 
know in advance that there is only a 50% chance that they will ever have 
to pay, then the deterrent effect of having to pay $200 (if and when they 
are caught) will be significantly diluted.  Instead, the threat of having to 
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pay $200 in damages will have an expected value of something closer to 
$100, once the 50% chance of escaping payment entirely is taken into 
account. 
Perhaps the most familiar solution to this problem requires that 
compensatory damages be multiplied by one over the probability that 
any given wrongdoer will be brought to justice.  Thus, if wrongdoers’ 
incentives could be optimized by threatening them with an expected cost 
equal to compensatory damages, or $200, it might make sense to 
increase to $400 the damages collected from those wrongdoers who 
actually get sued.  Under such a rule, all wrongdoers would face a 50% 
chance of having to pay $400 in damages, which works out to an 
expected cost of $200 (0.50 x $400 = $200).  Indeed, this method of 
adjusting for enforcement uncertainty has been known since 1800 or 
earlier.43  As a result, this solution (which I will call the “multiplier 
principle”) figures prominently in many economic analyses. 
Later analyses, however, have recognized that the multiplier principle 
may create inefficient incentives unless the multiplier is figured 
individually for each wrongdoer, based on that particular person’s 
probability of escaping punishment.  Obviously, if the multiplier must be 
figured individually in each case, this will add to the administrative costs 
of the system.  Less obviously, perhaps, the requirement that multipliers 
be calculated on an individual basis can also lead to odd results—odd 
from a corrective justice standpoint, that is, if not from the standpoint of 
economics.  For example, this solution may require that wrongdoers who 
commit the most egregious violations receive the smallest multipliers, if 
those are the wrongdoers whose violations are the most likely to be 
detected and punished.  By contrast, the largest multipliers (under this 
solution) would be assigned to wrongdoers who commit the smallest and 
most marginal violations—including violations whose illegality was not 
even clearly established—if these are the wrongdoers who are the least 
likely to be sued, and therefore the most likely to escape having to pay.44 
As a result, recent economic analyses have also considered the use of 
multipliers that are the same for all defendants, rather than being figured 
separately on a case-by-case basis.  Interestingly, if a constant multiplier 
is used, the most efficient multiplier will generally be less than the 
 
 43. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 325–26 (R. Hildreth trans., 
Trubner & Co. 1864) (1802).  In the modern economic literature, the multiplier principle 
owes its prominence to Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 
76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968). 
 44. For further discussion of this point, see Richard Craswell, Deterrence and 
Damages: The Multiplier Principle and Its Alternatives, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2185, 
2191–93 (1999).  Earlier models avoided this effect by restrictively assuming that the 
probability of having to pay damages was identical for all wrongdoers, regardless of the 
nature of their behavior. 
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traditional multiplier would suggest, meaning that it will be less than one 
over the probability of punishment faced by the average wrongdoer.  In 
some cases, the optimal multiplier could even be less than one, meaning 
that damages should be reduced (rather than augmented) in order to 
create efficient incentives in the presence of imperfect enforcement.45  If 
so, that could provide yet another reason why the most efficient remedy 
might be less than fully compensatory—another reason, that is, over and 
above the reasons discussed earlier involving efficient insurance against 
nonpecuniary losses (Part III.A), or efficient incentives for victims to 
adjust their own behavior (Parts III.B and III.C). 
Unfortunately (but perhaps realistically), these analyses also suggest 
that the exact size of the efficient multiplier will depend on a number of 
factors that are likely to be hard to measure.  For example, in these 
analyses the optimal multiplier is influenced by the rate at which the 
probability of paying damages changes, as wrongdoers’ behavior grows 
more or less egregious.  This is likely to be more difficult than 
estimating the actual probability faced by any particular wrongdoer, as 
required by the traditional case-by-case multiplier principle.46 
2.  Optimizing on Enforcement Expenditures 
In addition, further complications arise when we consider that the 
measure of damages may itself affect the probability of having to pay, if 
a higher measure of damages increases the number of victims who find it 
worth their while to file suit.  This effect would not matter (or not in the 
same way) in a system of purely public enforcement, for in that case the 
state could decide for itself how many prosecutions were worth bringing.47  
In any system of private enforcement, however—including the common 
law systems of contract, tort, and property—it is left to private plaintiffs 
to decide whether or when to bring suit.  Inevitably, the measure of 
damages the law makes available will affect each plaintiff’s decision. 
Once this effect is considered, the efficient damages could be either 
 
 45. Id. at 2198–2205. 
 46. For further discussion of these and other differences, see id. at 2223–36. 
 47. For analyses of the optimal level of public enforcement expenditures, see, for 
example, A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff Between the 
Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 880 (1979) [hereinafter 
Polinsky & Shavell, Optimal Tradeoff]; A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The 
Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment, 24 J. PUB. ECON. 89 (1984); Steven Shavell, 
Specific Versus General Enforcement of Law, 99 J. POL. ECON. 1088 (1991). 
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higher or lower (higher or lower, that is, than whatever measure of 
damages would otherwise be most efficient).  On the one hand, any 
reduction in the measure of damages could reduce the number of 
lawsuits that were filed, thereby reducing total litigation expenditures.  
On the other hand, a reduced measure of damages could also reduce the 
deterrent effect on wrongdoers’ behavior, both directly (because 
wrongdoers would not have to pay as much if convicted) and indirectly 
(because fewer plaintiffs would find it worthwhile to sue).  If this reduced 
deterrent effect led to an increase in the total number of wrongs committed, 
that could increase the total amount spent on litigation, even while the 
probability of any particular wrong being litigated had declined.48 
Indeed, similar adjustments may be required (with similarly ambiguous 
effects on total welfare) if collecting higher damage awards is more 
expensive for any other reason.  For example, if courts or juries require a 
higher burden of proof before they will impose higher damage awards, 
that could increase the cost of gathering evidence and of litigating.49  
Higher damage awards might also be more costly to collect, if the threat 
of higher damage awards leads wrongdoers to spend more on litigating 
to resist a finding of liability, or to resist collection of the higher awards 
by trying to conceal their assets.50  Also, if potential wrongdoers are 
themselves risk-averse, increases in the damage award will increase their 
risk-bearing costs.51  As all of these effects increase the total social costs 
associated with higher damage awards, their net effect will often be to 
reduce the optimal level of damages.  However, this effect too is subject 
to the ambiguity noted earlier—that is, if higher damage awards 
strengthen the law’s deterrent effect by so much that far fewer violations 
are committed, it could be that higher awards would reduce the total 
costs associated with litigating and collecting damages.52 
In short, the analysis of efficient remedies is complicated enough even 
 
 48. For a formal model of these effects, see A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. 
Rubinfeld, The Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation for the Level of Liability, 17 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 151 (1988).  For a qualitatively similar analysis, see David Friedman, An 
Economic Explanation of Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1125, 1133–34 (1989). 
 49. For formal models of various aspects of this issue, see, for example, James 
Andreoni, Reasonable Doubt and the Optimal Magnitude of Fines: Should the Penalty 
Fit the Crime?, 22 RAND J. ECON. 385 (1991); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 
Accuracy in the Determination of Liability, 37 J.L. & ECON. 1, 13–14 (1994); Daniel L. 
Rubinfeld & David E.M. Sappington, Efficient Awards and Standards of Proof in 
Judicial Proceedings, 18 RAND J. ECON. 308 (1987). 
 50. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1193, 1207 (1985).  For a formal model of these costs, see Arun S. Malik, 
Avoidance, Screening and Optimum Enforcement, 21 RAND J. ECON. 341 (1990). 
 51. Polinsky & Shavell, Optimal Tradeoff, supra note 47, at 884–86; Louis 
Kaplow, The Optimal Probability and Magnitude of Fines for Acts that Definitely Are 
Undesirable, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1992). 
 52. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
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if we consider only two sets of consequences: (a) the deterrent effect on 
wrongdoers, together with (b) the effect on total enforcement costs.  
That is, even if we limit our attention to these two effects alone, the most 
efficient measure of damages could be either higher or lower than an 
exactly compensatory measure.  Moreover, any full-scale instrumental 
analysis cannot stop with these two effects, but must also consider the 
other effects discussed earlier in this paper.  For example, a full analysis 
would also have to consider (c) any deterrent effects on victims’ own 
behavior, as well as (d) the level of insurance each remedy provides.  As 
I observed at the outset, this complicates matters considerably. 
G.  Efficient Breach and Efficient Takings 
Finally, let me now return to the example with which I began this 
survey, involving a deliberate (or nonprobabilistic) breach of contract, or 
a deliberate (or nonprobabilistic) taking of the victim’s property.  As 
long as the breach or the taking is certain, rather than merely being 
probabilistic, we no longer need to worry about the dimension of 
efficiency involving precautions to reduce the likelihood of harm.  
Instead, in this example we have to worry about the incentives that 
govern the deliberate choice between breaking and performing a 
contract, or between taking another’s property and leaving it alone.  For 
simplicity, I will focus hereafter on the incentives to breach or perform, 
though a very similar analysis would apply to the incentives to take or 
not to take. 
As we saw in Part II.A, the earliest economic analyses concluded that 
efficient incentives to perform or breach could be created by making 
every breacher pay full compensatory damages, no more and no less.  
However, even the earliest analyses recognized that compensatory 
damage measures represented just one possible way that the incentive to 
breach might be optimized.  Compensatory damage measures could 
optimize the incentive to breach by means of a “liability rule,” but it 
might also be possible to optimize those incentives by means of a 
“property rule,” which required the would-be breacher to buy the other 
party’s permission before she would be released from her contract.  
Under a property rule, of course, damages for failing to secure the other 
party’s permission need not be set at an exactly compensatory level.  
Instead, damages under a property rule could be raised to an even higher 
level—in theory, they could be raised to infinity—in order to strictly 
deter the wrongdoer from breaching without the other party’s consent. 
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1.  Property Rules Versus Liability Rules 
From this starting point, more recent analyses have complicated the 
analysis in several ways.  First, there has been a good deal of analysis 
devoted to determining just when liability rules are likely to create better 
incentives than property rules, or vice versa.  The early article by 
Calabresi and Melamed53 suggested that (a) liability rules were better 
than property rules whenever transaction costs were high, but that (b) 
property rules dominated liability rules whenever transaction costs were 
low, because if transaction costs were low there would then be no barrier 
preventing one party to negotiate to get the other’s permission to breach.  
However, both of these conclusions have been called into question by 
more recent work. 
For example, if transaction costs are low, it should indeed be easy for 
the parties to negotiate around an inefficient assignment of property 
rights, and this could increase the attractiveness of property rules (just as 
Calabresi and Melamed noted).54  However, if transaction costs are low, 
it should be equally easy for the parties to negotiate around an inefficient 
liability rule.  As a consequence, low transaction costs do not by 
themselves give us any reason to favor property rules over liability rules 
(or vice versa).  Instead, more recent analyses of this issue suggest that 
the choice between property rules and liability rules, if transaction costs 
are low, should instead depend on such factors as the likelihood and 
effects of judicial errors, either in estimating damages under a liability 
rule, or in assigning the initial entitlement under a property rule.  The 
choice might also depend on the potential for practical problems such as 
multiple takings (A takes from B, then C takes from B, then D takes from 
C) or reciprocal takings (A takes from B, then B takes from A, then A 
takes back again from B). 
Indeed, the recent literature on this topic is now so extensive that it 
deserves a survey of its own, in more detail than this paper can 
provide.55  For present purposes, I will merely note that whenever the 
 
 53. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8. 
 54. Id. at 1106–09. 
 55. That recent literature includes, among many others, James E. Krier & Stewart 
J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 440 (1995); Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a 
Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995); Louis 
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic 
Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996); Richard R.W. Brooks, The Relative Burden of 
Determining Property Rules and Liability Rules: Broken Elevators in the Cathedral, 97 
NW. U. L. REV. 267 (2002); Ronen Avraham, Modular Liability Rules (Univ. of Mich., 
Working Paper No. 01-003, 2001), available at http://www.law.umich.edu/centersand 
programs/olin/abstracts/discussionpapers/2001/avraham-03.pdf (last visited Aug. 23, 2003); 
Ian Ayres & Paul M. Goldbart, Correlated Values in the Theory of Property and Liability 
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law uses property rules, the resulting damages for violation of those 
rules will not even be intended to be compensatory.  Instead, damages in 
a regime of property rules are designed for deterrence rather than for 
compensation: They are designed to deter the wrongdoer from taking 
someone else’s property without first securing the property holder’s 
consent.  As a result, damages for violations of property rules can and 
should be set high enough to strictly deter such unconsented takings.56  
In this respect, any argument in favor of property rules is also an 
argument against compensatory damages. 
2.  Property Rules and Penalty Defaults 
For similar reasons, I will only briefly allude to a set of arguments that 
might justify noncompensatory remedies in contract law, when those 
remedies are a form of “penalty default rule.”  A default rule, of course, 
is a rule (including a remedial rule) that contracting parties are allowed 
to alter by specifying some other rule in their contract.  And a “penalty 
default,” as that term has come to be used, is simply a default rule that 
most parties are likely to want to alter.57  For example, a rule that 
provided for no remedies at all in the event of breach—no remedies, that 
is, except for whatever remedy the parties explicitly agreed to in their 
contract—would be a penalty default rule, as long as most parties would 
not want a relationship in which there were no damages at all for breach.  
In that event, the threat of being subject to a rule of no damages at all 
should motivate most parties to provide for some other remedy in their 
contract. 
Though the parallel has not often been discussed, penalty default rules 
have a good deal in common with property rules.  That is, penalty 
defaults (like property rules) are designed to encourage the parties to 
negotiate explicitly with one another, and thus to choose their own 
 
Rules, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 121 (2003). 
 56. Several aspects of this distinction—between damages intended to compensate 
and damages intended to deter—are usefully discussed in Robert Cooter, Prices and 
Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523 (1984).  Though Cooter does not explicitly draw this 
analogy, damages used to enforce liability rules correspond to what he labels “prices,” 
while damages used to enforce property rules correspond to what he calls “sanctions.”  A 
similar distinction is also discussed in Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the 
Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 GEO. L.J. 421, 423 (1998). 
 57. The term is due to Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete 
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989). 
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allocation of rights and duties.58  As a result, a court employing a penalty 
default need not decide on its own what allocation of rights and duties 
(or what remedies) would in fact be most appropriate.  Instead, the court 
need only pick a term that is sufficiently unattractive (to one or both 
parties) so as to induce those parties to negotiate explicitly. 
Indeed, even before the term “penalty default” was coined, scholars 
had suggested that noncompensatory remedies in certain contract cases 
might be justified on precisely this ground.  For instance, Victor 
Goldberg has argued that consumers who break their contracts with 
retailers should not be liable for the full profits those retailers lose, 
unless the retailers had explicitly stipulated that amount up front in their 
sales contracts.59  Similarly, Timothy Muris has suggested that, even 
when damages might otherwise be limited to exclude certain elements of 
subjective value, no such exclusion should be allowed (at least in certain 
consumer contracts) unless the limitation was explicitly provided for in 
the contract itself.60  In each case, the argument is that the default 
remedy—not the remedy that will necessarily be collected, but the 
default rule that serves as a starting point for negotiations—should 
deliberately be set at a level that is not compensatory. 
In short, arguments in favor of “penalty defaults” can also be invoked 
to support noncompensatory remedies, just as arguments in favor of 
property rules can be.  However, the arguments in favor of penalty defaults 
implicate many other issues concerning the optimal choice of default 
rules, and those issues, too, deserve a survey of their own.61  For purposes 
of this survey, I merely note the possibility that noncompensatory 
damage rules might be defended as a more desirable starting point for 
negotiations, before turning back to arguments about whether compensatory 
damages are the ones it would be most efficient to actually collect.  In 
other words, in the remainder of this section I will focus on the choice of 
damage rules (for deliberate or nonprobabilistic takings or breaches) 
once the law has decided to employ liability rules rather than property 
rules—or, in contract law, once the law has decided to adopt a 
“majoritarian” rather than a “penalty” default rule.62 
 
 58. I discuss these similarities briefly in Craswell, supra note 22, at 12–14. 
 59. Victor P. Goldberg, An Economic Analysis of the Lost-Volume Retail Seller, 57 
S. CAL. L. REV. 283, 294–97 (1984). 
 60. Muris, supra note 5, at 390. 
 61. See, e.g., Symposium on Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 3 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 1 (1993). 
 62. The term “majoritarian default rule” was also coined by Ayres & Gertner, 
supra note 57, at 93. 
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3.  Efficient Damages Under Liability Rules 
The choice of damages under a liability rule is trivial if the court and both 
parties always know the exact loss that a breach or taking would inflict 
on the victim.  In that case, damages equal to the victim’s entire loss will 
create exactly the right incentives for the potential breacher, just as in the 
earliest analyses discussed in Part II.A.  But what if the potential breacher or 
the court do not know the exact loss that a breach would inflict? 
If the court cannot observe actual damages in every case, one solution 
is to set the measure of damages at the average loss that most victims 
would suffer.63  This approach would yield remedies that might be called 
“compensatory” on average, even if they were not compensatory in each 
individual case.  But recent work suggests that the incentives for efficient 
breach (or efficient takings) might be even better if remedies were set 
deliberately above that level, to take advantage of the private information 
that is implicitly revealed by the breacher’s decision to commit a 
breach.64  In effect, this approach treats the breacher’s “right” to breach 
and pay damages (under a liability rule) as being similar to a financial 
option, in that it can be exercised or not at the breacher’s choice.65  Thus, 
in any case where the breacher has chosen to exercise that option—and it 
is only in these cases that damages will ever be at issue—the very fact of 
the breacher’s decision may reveal something about the value of the 
option, thus permitting a more finely-tuned measure of damages. 
4.  The Effect on Other Incentives 
Finally, the analysis of nonprobabilistic or “deliberate” breach has 
also been complicated in still another way by recent analyses.  The 
complication here stems from the fact that whatever damage measure 
optimizes the incentives to breach or to take may not be the measure that 
optimizes any of the other incentives that we care about. 
This issue, too, was absent in most of the earliest analyses.  For 
 
 63. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 55, at 725–32. 
 64. See, e.g., Avraham, supra note 55; Ian Ayres & Paul M. Goldbart, Optimal 
Delegation and Decoupling in the Design of Liability Rules, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2001). 
 65. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property 
Rules, Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703, 729–33 (1996); Ian Ayres, 
Protecting Property with Puts, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 793 (1998).  For earlier analyses that 
also noted the similarity between damage rules and options, see Madeline Morris, The 
Structure of Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 822, 854–56 (1993); Paul G. Mahoney, 
Contract Remedies and Options Pricing, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1995). 
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example, in the earliest “efficient breach” articles, the sole aim of the 
analysis was to identify the rules that would lead to efficient choices 
between performing and breaking the contract, with no regard to the 
effect those rules might have on any other incentives.  In effect, the early 
analyses proceeded as if the only question of any economic interest was 
whose hands the widget ought to end up in.  Similarly, in Calabresi and 
Melamed’s classic article on takings and nuisance law, their focus was 
almost entirely on creating incentives for efficient decisions between 
polluting and not polluting, or between taking and not taking.  Lucian 
Bebchuk has recently described this as a focus on “ex post” incentives, 
meaning the incentives governing the final decision to take or not to take 
(or to breach or not to breach), with very little concern for any earlier or 
ex ante decisions whose incentives might also be affected.66 
To be sure, the economic analysis of contract remedies quickly 
proceeded beyond this original narrow focus.  Thus, there is now a well-
developed literature analyzing the effect of damage remedies on the 
parties’ incentives to make investments in reliance on a contract, or to 
take precautions to reduce the likelihood of a breach, or to search more 
carefully for other parties with whom to contract, or to make any number 
of ex ante decisions whose incentives might also be relevant.67  For some 
reason, the analysis of other incentives has not been as advanced in 
connection with property and nuisance law—though there are encouraging 
signs that this is beginning to change.68 
In the end, though, this point is merely another version of an 
observation that has been made throughout this survey.  Once we focus 
carefully on the instrumental effects of legal remedies, it is obvious that 
there are many different effects that the law might care about, and the 
remedy that is best at achieving any one of these effects might not be 
best at achieving others.  In the simple models of the 1970s, this trade-
off often did not arise, for compensatory remedies often seemed to be 
best at achieving all of the effects with which those earlier models were 
concerned.  But now that analysts have steadily expanded the range of 
effects that they consider, it has become impossible to ignore the fact 
that some effects may have to be traded off against others.69 
 
 66. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Property Rights and Liability Rules: The Ex Ante View 
of the Cathedral, 100 MICH. L. REV. 601 (2001). 
 67. For an early survey, see Craswell, supra note 11. 
 68. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 66; Rohan Pitchford & Christopher M. Snyder, 
Coming to the Nuisance: An Economic Analysis from an Incomplete Contracts Perspective, 
19 J.L. ECON. & ORG. (forthcoming Fall 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=280842 (last visited Aug. 23, 2003). 
 69. For an interesting argument to the effect that these complexities have become 
so unmanageable that economic analysis has “failed” contract law, see Eric A. Posner, 
Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 
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IV.  ECONOMICS CONTRASTED WITH CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 
One purpose of this survey has been to demonstrate that economic 
analysis does not always support the use of compensatory damages.  A 
deeper purpose, though, has been to show that the idea of compensation 
plays a very different role in economic theories than in theories of 
corrective justice.  Specifically, while compensation is foundational to 
the very idea of corrective justice, compensation is only incidentally 
connected (if it is even connected at all) with economic welfare. 
More specifically, theories of corrective justice take compensation as 
their remedial aim or goal.  In order to carry out that goal, the theories 
must then answer two sorts of questions.  First, they must decide which 
losses should be included in the set for which compensation is required.  
(For example, should we compensate for emotional distress?  For lost 
opportunities?  For the loss of future expectations?)  Second, corrective 
justice theories require some method of assigning actual dollar values to 
each compensable loss.  (For example, should we measure the dollar 
value of a loss by its market value?  Or by the victim’s subjective 
willingness to pay?  Or by some other measure entirely?) 
The other contributions to this symposium have illustrated the 
difficulties raised by the first set of questions (which losses should be 
compensated at all?).  The answer to this question depends partly on an 
underlying theory of rights or entitlements, for presumably no 
compensation is owed if no entitlement was infringed.  But even when 
each party’s entitlements have been established, corrective justice limits 
compensable losses to those that were caused by somebody’s wrongdoing.  
Obviously, this limit then requires a theory of what makes behavior 
wrongful.  But it also requires a theory about when a loss is caused by 
someone’s wrongful behavior, thus giving rise to all of the difficulties 
posed by concurrent causes or by moral luck.  (For example, if I light a 
fire that would normally burn your house, what if someone else happens 
to burn your house first, before my fire can reach it?)70 
 
YALE L.J. 829 (2003).  For my own views, which are less pessimistic, see Richard 
Craswell, In That Case, What Is the Question? Economics and the Demands of Contract 
Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 903 (2003).  Another response to Posner can be found in Ian 
Ayres, Valuing Modern Contract Scholarship, 112 YALE L.J. 881 (2003). 
 70. For a discussion of these issues, see, for example, Michael Moore, For What 
Must We Pay? Causation and Counterfactual Baselines, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1181 
(2003); Stephen Perry, Harm, History, and Counterfactuals, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1283 
(2003); Richard W. Wright, The Grounds and Extent of Legal Responsibility, 40 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 1425 (2003). 
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Moreover, even after we have determined which losses to compensate, 
corrective justice theories still need some way to measure that 
compensation in numerical dollar values.  Unfortunately, questions of 
monetary valuation have rarely (if ever) been addressed by corrective 
justice theorists.  For example, the loss of a house might be measured by 
the amount the owner would have been willing to pay to keep the 
house—but there is no obvious reason why corrective justice theories 
should require this measure of value.  Still less is there any reason why 
corrective justice theories should require that a loss be measured by its 
market value, or by its assessment for purposes of property taxes, or 
(indeed) by any other particular numerical measure. 
In the end, the difficulty is that the core concept of compensation, 
taken by itself, is not nearly thick enough to entail any answers to 
questions like these.  The goal of compensation may tell us to restore the 
value of that which is lost, or something along those lines, but possible 
measures of “value” are a dime a dozen.  And as long as compensation is 
taken as a brute premise of corrective justice, there is no further goal 
behind that premise to which we can look for a more specific answer. 
How, then, do economic theories avoid this problem?  The answer is 
that economic theories do not take compensation itself to be a premise or 
a goal.  Instead, the goals of economic theories all concern particular 
consequences of awarding damages: consequences like deterring various 
forms of undesirable behavior, or providing optimal levels of insurance.  
In economic theories, therefore, questions about the exact measure of 
damages can all be recast not as questions about the definition of 
“compensation,” but rather as questions about what measure will 
produce the best effects.  In short, in economic theories the concept of 
compensation can be dispensed with entirely, whereas in corrective 
justice theories that concept is absolutely crucial.71 
This same conclusion can be stated, in a slightly more radical form, by 
realizing that from the standpoint of an economic theory, any point on 
the real number line is potentially available as a measure of damages.  
To be sure, many of those available numbers will not correspond to 
anything that might be called compensation, in the sense that they will 
not match any standard measure of the value of any particular asset or 
entitlement.  From the standpoint of economics, though, it makes no 
difference if the selected number does or does not match any standard 
measure of the value of any asset.  If that number happens to provide a 
 
 71. The concept of compensation might also be relevant—or it might not—to those 
who are concerned with the commodifying effects of monetary damages.  For a useful 
discussion of this issue, which draws on some of the economic analysis surveyed here, 
see MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 184–205 (1996). 
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better mix of incentives and insurance (all things considered) than any 
other number that might be used, then that is the measure of damages 
that ought to be awarded—as long as we are still looking at things from 
the standpoint of economics.  By contrast, though, if we look at matters 
from the standpoint of corrective justice, it apparently is crucial to pick a 
number that does correspond to some standard measure of value of some 
asset or entitlement.  Only then can the resulting damage award plausibly 
be described as compensating for a particular loss. 
In the contracts literature, this focus on the value of particular assets or 
entitlements can be seen in the influence of the classic article by Fuller 
and Perdue.72  Fuller and Perdue famously defined three entitlements or 
“interests” that might be lost when a contract is breached: (1) the 
expectation interest, or the value that the nonbreacher would have 
received from performance of the contract; (2) the reliance interest, or 
the value that the nonbreacher would have received if he or she had 
never agreed to the contract in the first place; and (3) the restitution 
interest, or that part of the reliance loss that the breaching party may 
have received as an extra benefit because of the breach.  As a result, 
countless subsequent contract scholars have taken the key remedial 
question to be which of these three interests is most deserving of 
compensation. 
As I have argued elsewhere, framing the issue in so narrow a way 
unduly limits the inquiry.73  Yes, the three interests of Fuller and Perdue 
are three of the possible measures of damages that contract law might 
award.  But so, too, are any number of other measures, including all the 
numbers produced by the various ways of assigning dollar values to each 
of these three interests, and also including the even larger range of 
numbers that may not correspond to the value of any particular interest.  
Once this is seen, the fascination with awards that happen to match the 
value of a particular interest—or, more precisely, with awards that 
happen to match some particular way of measuring in dollars the value 
of any particular interest—is extremely difficult to justify.74  One might 
 
 72. Fuller & Perdue I, supra note 2, at 53–54. 
 73. Richard Craswell, Against Fuller and Perdue, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 99 (2000) 
[hereinafter Craswell, Against Fuller and Perdue]; Richard Craswell, How We Got This 
Way: Further Thoughts on Fuller and Perdue, 1 ISSUES LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP Art. 2 
(2001), at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss1/art2 (last visited July 27, 2003). 
 74. Significantly, this seems to have been Fuller’s view as well.  As Fuller later 
wrote, “I consider the contribution made in my article on the reliance interest to lie, not 
in calling attention to the reliance interest itself, but in an analysis which breaks down 
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almost as plausibly urge that contract law limit its damage awards to 
round numbers, so that it need only consider awards in exact multiples 
of $10,000 or $100,000. 
To be sure, this problem may be particularly acute in contract law, 
where the entitlement that is injured by the breach is created by the 
contract, and thus is itself an issue of contractual and legal interpretation.  
As a consequence, selecting a contract remedy is part and parcel of 
defining the entitlement created by the contract, so it is difficult for 
corrective justice theories even to find a starting point.75  By contrast, in 
tort law and property law, it may be easier to define the relevant 
entitlements according to some prior, independent theory of legal rights.  
If so—and I take no position on whether that “if” is warranted—then 
corrective justice theories may perhaps be better able to limit the 
permissible range of remedies in those fields of law. 
In any event, it should by now be clear that the concept of 
compensation plays a very different role in corrective justice theories 
than it does in economics.  Even when economists and corrective justice 
theorists agree about the outcome, and thus endorse the same measure of 
damages, they will do so for very different reasons.  And when questions 
arise (as they inevitably will) about how that measure should be applied 
in any particular case, the economists and the corrective justice theorists 
will look to very different considerations to answer those questions. 
 
 
the contract-no contract dichotomy, and substitutes an ascending scale of enforceability.”  
Letter from Lon L. Fuller to Karl N. Llewellyn (Dec. 8, 1939), reprinted in ROBERT S. 
SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED OBLIGATION: THEORY, 
DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 41 (3d ed. 1997) (emphasis added). 
 75. For further discussion of this point, see Craswell, Against Fuller and Perdue, 
supra note 73, at 121–28; Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the 
Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489, 503–11 (1989). 
